The article focuses on the reflection of my research experience in obtaining qualitative data using narrative interviews. I confronted my own research experience with the phenomenological methodology of Alfred Schütz, dramaturgical sociology of Erving Goffman, and interpretative sociology of Max Weber. The article discusses three problems that emerged during a longitudinal study of everyday life transformation in the long-term horizon of sixty years: 1. How to create a concept of everyday life so it serves not only as a tool for collecting, analyzing, and interpreting data, but also as a tool for understanding the meanings of the examined empirical world; 2. How to discursively create an Qualitative Sociology Review • www.qualitativesociologyreview.org
7 cific research results, 2 but on the issue of obtaining qualitative data, that is, the researcher's interview with a participant (communication partner).
3 It is an analysis and interpretation of my research experience. The long-term stay in the field, increasing the number of interviews (more than 200 in the end) and multiplying field notes, gradually brought me to issues of how reality is formed during interviews and how and to what extent it is possible to reach understanding between a researcher and a participant. Such thorny questions occur when a researcher stays in the field for a long time, uses more research techniques, and repeatedly returns to communication partners. That is why I would like to reflect on my research practices in this article. and its everyday life based on an emic approach in order to present the understanding of the (historical) transformation of rural everyday life as seen, perceived, reflected, and assessed by the rural people themselves.
5
I defined countryside as an area formed by everyday practices perceived as rural and by a wide range of everyday representations of the "ordinary" population. This area generates stable patterns of behavior, emotions, and meanings that affect everyday rural life (cf. Halfacree 1993; .
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Published research results, see : Kubátová 2013; 2014; 2016a; 2016b; Kubátová et al. 2015; Anýžová, Kubátová, and Znebejánek 2016; Anýžová, Kubátová, and Matějů 2016. 3 For the purposes of this text, the terms "communication partner" and "participant" are used as synonyms. 4 The Czech suburban countryside is formed by rural municipalities located in the hinterland of regional cities.
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On the possibilities of generalizing qualitative research cases, see : Flyvbjerg 2006. The research methodology (data collection, their analysis, and interpretation) was based on this research question: How has the perspective of the suburban countryside population on rural everyday life changed from the 1950s to the present day?
The selected emic approach to the transformation of rural everyday life motivated the selection of qualitative research methods and techniques. The data were mainly collected and analyzed using the grounded theory method (Corbin and Straus 1990; Strauss and Corbin 1997) . Luckmann (Schütz 1944; 1945; 1953; 1962; 1964; 1966; 1970; 1981; Schütz and Luckmann 1973) .
Based on the self-reflection of my research practices and reflection of relevant aspects of phenomenological sociology, three methodological problems will be successively discussed:
1. Forming a concept of everyday life as a tool for empirical research. In my opinion, forming a concept is a key act of qualitative research, since it contributes significantly to the formulation of the research problem, the definition of the research subject, and selection of the research strategy. How to define a concept so it serves not only as a tool for collecting, analyzing, and interpreting data but also as a tool for 2. The research subject as a discursively formed image of everyday life transformations. As the aforementioned research question implies, transformations over a long period of sixty years were investigated, which brought the issue of everyday life temporality and the possibilities of an adequate sociological approach to it to the center of the research problem. The past of everyday life cannot be monitored directly, and it is necessary to draw on witnesses' memories.
What does it mean to study a past that exists only in memories?
3. Understanding between the participant and the researcher during a face-to-face interview.
In such a situation, is it methodologically useful to create two worlds, a world of science and a world of everyday life, and try to be a disinterested observer? 6 My creation of a concept was based on the methodology of ideal types formed by Max Weber (1949), which was later followed by Schütz (1964) . Ideal types are constructed based on empirical facts to which participants assigned a cultural significance.
Creating the Concept of Everyday Life
The researcher subsequently selects those which correspond to their theoretical interest. As Weber says, it is important that a created concept was simultaneously adequate to the subjective meaning of the participants' actions, as well as to the research question. It must neither be too empirically empty (i.e., theoretic), because then it would not correspond to the empirical world, nor too rich in content (i.e., empirical), because then it would only be a description of reality with a small range (cf. also Hekman 1983 ). Weber's requirement is reflected in Schütz's (1954) assumption about the specific meaning of social reality for human beings who live, act, and think in it. The world has already been interpreted by people's everyday constructs and they experience it as their everyday reality. Scientists' objects of thought must be based on people's objects of thoughts.
For that reason, I combined the theory and experience when forming the heuristic concept of "every- When creating a concept, I proceeded from the fact that everyday life is embedded in rural social relationships, which can be implied not only from the formulation of the research problem but also from the phenomenological assumption that the world of everyday life is a socio-cultural world in which we relate to our neighbors in various ways and in various degrees of anonymity and intimacy (Schütz 1954 ). Everyday life is therefore approached as an intersubjective phenomenon manifesting the values, norms, needs, and wishes of people, their interests and goals. It takes place in social reality, which I understand in accordance with Schütz (1954) as a reality that is experienced in the everyday thought of people who were born into it and had to learn to live in it.
The world of everyday life is, together with the world of dreams, fantasy, and science, a part of the life-world, an umbrella term as considered by Schütz (1962) . It is a framework forming a unity of these four sub-worlds, while the world of everyday
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For example, balls, religious festivals, awarding important and successful personalities of the region, various meetings of citizen associations, and also family celebrations, ordinary family days, et cetera.
life represents the paramount reality. It is a world of work, pragmatic approach, and practice, which is not the dominant subject of thinking, but a world of action and practical orientation in it (Schütz 1962; 1966; Schütz and Luckmann 1973) . In addition to that, some actions are at a certain time in the communication partner's everyday life background (e.g., childcare, when they do not have children or they no longer live with them; the public sphere under communism) and some of them in the foreground (e.g., work at the time of economic activity; the private sphere under communism).
The knowledge of the past motivation and strategies adapted by people helps understand their present motivation and strategies. Hence, if we want to understand the present of everyday life, it is necessary to explore its past. As written by Chris Hann (2015) , the past, present, and future must be analyzed simultaneously.
The Research Subject as a Discursively Formed Image of Everyday Life Transformations
To examine everyday life transformations over a long period of sixty years means to examine a past that exists only in memories, that is, a narrated past. This problem was also addressed by Schütz (1953) using the motives of "in-order-to" and "because." Participants living in the ongoing process of their actions reflect only on the "in-order-to motives" of their actions, that is, the projected state of affairs to be undertaken. Only if they return to their already performed actions or to past phases of still ongoing action anticipating the act, participants may retrospectively grasp the "because motives" that led them to do what they projected to do. Then the participants do not act-they observe themselves.
Given the above, I was aware that I was not primarily investigating a participant's logic of everyday life and its transformations, but the "discourse" in which participants narrate, for example, the way they lived I perceived more that everyday life is discontinuous and only narration makes it a complex entity.
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At this point, I began to approach the issue of oral history, which works with narratives that are perceived as images of participants' life events or life events of someone else verbalized by participants. The purpose is not to determine what happened in the past, but to reveal the interpretation of an individual or a group (cf., e.g., Bertaux, Thompson, and Thompson 1993; Thompson 2000) .
Or, as Berger and Luckmann (1966) state, individual actions are shaped according to interrelated parts of life at the moment people think about their lives.
We can assume that there is a relationship between the participant's practical logic and the narration because the participant is in a discourse with the researcher about what actually happened long (or not so long) ago. However, the participants' "quasi-theory" of their own past of everyday life corresponds semantically with the present, that is, the point in time when the past is being described.
That is why the dramaturgical sociology of Erving Goffman (1959) Goffman's theater metaphor makes it tempting to understand a qualitative face-to-face interview as a theater performance. In my opinion, however, Goffman (1959) does not address aspects of theater that penetrate everyday life. He deals with the structure of social encounters, while the key factor of this structure is to maintain a uniform definition of the situation. The metaphor of theater is included in the assumption that this definition has to be expressed (introduced), and this expression has to be maintained despite a number of potential disruptions. To present a definition of the situation means that the actor makes an impression upon the observer. The observer has to rely on this impression, which, of course, creates the possibility for the actor to distort reality by manipulating the impression given to the observer. This could mean that every social encounter is hypocritical and deceptive. In fact, however, Goffman argues that everyday life is surrounded by a number of courtesy, etiquette, and moral norms.
While there is always the possibility that the observed person is manipulating the impression, this is not a rule.
The participant, therefore, constitutes a definition of the situation. This almost always results in surface consistency in defining the situation because it is not expected that participants will express their true feelings and honestly agree with the feelings of others. Instead, it is expected that participants will suppress their immediate feelings and that their statements will be at least partially respected and It can be said that each generation has its own history. That is why introducing historical context into the research, that is, linear time of everyday life, is problematic. Although the participants whose past and present everyday life I examined were my contemporaries because we shared a place and time during the interview, I was aware that there are generational differences in terms of our knowledge of the world. Schütz (1954; 1981) Mannheim (1954) surmised, that is, that differently generationally embedded people have different aspect structures that determine how a person sees a certain thing, understands it, and constructs facts. My experience with research interviews shows that this problem is not identical to Schütz's (1953; , but describes differences between individual perspectives leading to the current participant's knowledge being only potential knowledge of persons related and vice versa. 
Understanding between the Participant and Researcher during the Interview
First, I briefly describe the interview situation. As mentioned above, within the pilot field study essential for creating the heuristic sensitized concept of everyday life, I conducted several unstructured indepth interviews and both structured and unstructured observations, including an analysis of available documents. After I had constructed a working version of the concept of everyday life, I began to design a semi-structured interview script consisting of topics relevant to my research subject. According to Schütz (1954) , it is necessary to distinguish between knowledge within everyday meaning and knowledge as a method specific to social sciences. Schütz does not view understanding primarily as a scientific method, but rather a specific form of experience we use within our everyday thinking 15 Schütz's phenomenology defines a self-standardization phenomenon: by standardizing the behavior of others we standardize our own behavior in connection with theirs (Schütz 1953). to identify our socio-cultural world and live in it.
Schütz assumes that the world is experienced in everyday thinking in a standardized form. The participants are given objects and events, and which of their features or qualities they consider unique and which standard depends on their current interests and system of relevance. Interests and the system of relevance are determined biographically and situationally and are subjectively experienced in everyday knowledge as systems of behavior motives, choices to be made, projects to be conducted, and objectives to be achieved (cf. also Schütz 1970; Schütz and Luckmann 1973) . Schütz (1954) claims that a second participant can understand these motives, choices, projects, and objectives (and through them the first participant's behavior) only in their standardized form. Therefore, in the everyday world, participants construct standardized patterns of participants' motives, objectives, attitudes, and personalities, and their current behavior is nearly a case or example of such. These standardized knowledge constructs replace the personal world knowledge of individual participants. Everyday world knowledge is based on fundamental idealization known as the reciprocity of perspectives. According to Schütz (1953) , this idealization overcomes the differences in individual perspectives stemming from the participant seeing something different than other participants and their different biographical situations. This overcomes the problem of participants' current knowledge being nearly the potential knowledge of persons related and vice versa.
However, Schütz (1954) claims that a social scientist is supposed to approach the social world differently. 16 The researcher then uses the formulated scientific problem when developing concepts, as well as scientific standardizations (i.e., scientific ideal types, so-called second-order constructs) through which he/she understands the participant's behavior and the life-world. According to Schütz (1954; 1964) , social scientists observe certain facts and events in social reality and based on them create standard types (ideal types) of behavior or courses of action. However, they cannot overstep the boundary created by defining the scientific problem (postulate of relevance). They then coordinate these patterns with ideal participant models (so-called homunculi) which equipped the systems of relevance (i.e., standard practical purposes and objectives). Each homunculus is assumed to be related to other homunculi through interaction formulas. Each and every construct must be developed based on formal logic principles and must be adequate to the participants' everyday subjective world; therefore, it must be comprehensible to the partici-
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In this respect, Schütz (1954) follows Max Weber, who postulated the objectivity of social sciences by disconnecting them from value patterns which (may) control the participant's behavior on the social scene. However, I believe Weber (1949) complements his concept of the value neutrality of a scientist with the so-called value relationship, which he understands as a research gesture allowing research within a specific culture, with culture being a semantic framework giving meaning to behavior. Therefore, he emphasized the historical uniqueness and specificity of each cultural phenomenon. In my opinion,
Schütz disregards the cultural specificity of a research problem, for he assumes cultural universalism. at their disposal determining relevance levels and functions as an unquestionable reference outline (Schütz 1944; 1945) . On the other hand, scientists have their cognitive interests and relevance systems determined by a scientific problem.
In my opinion, a problem arises when we, as researchers, ask whether we can understand the par- My research experience leads me to the conclusion that in order to achieve the adequacy of scientific theory and participant's subjective world in the everyday world, the scientist cannot be removed from the social reality he/she studies. He/she cannot disregard his/her biographical situation and with it all the systems of relevance, practical interests, motives, and choices of a researcher as an inhabitant of life-world because he/she would lose one of the key sources of understanding of the participant in the face-to-face communication situation. The researcher in an interview situation cannot be a mere objective observer; he/she must communicate with the participant in the true sense of the word. In this case, he/she cannot "communicate" only on the basis of his/her scientific relevance, but must also incorporate his/her relevance from the everyday world into the communication. Therefore, he/she has to bring his/her own life-world into the field. Naturally, aside from that, he/she has to possess a sufficiently sophisticated and defined scientific problem that must respect the life-world of the participants;
otherwise the scientist does not deal with the real world, but the world of fantasy.
According to Schütz (1954; 1964) , when we live in the same life-world common to us all, there is no need to construct two worlds, the world of every- or everyday preconceptions into the research situation, we cannot prevent it. I believe that this is not a catastrophe threatening the validity of our results.
Our scientific conclusions can always be only probabilistic, but the more they arise from our true understanding, the closer we get to the world of ideas of our communication partners. 
Conclusion

